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Abstract 
This paper analyses efficiency drivers of a representative sample of European banks by 
means of the two-stage procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007). In the first 
stage, the technical efficiency of banks is estimated using DEA (data envelopment 
analysis) in order to establish which of them are most efficient. Their ranking is based on 
total productivity in the period 1993-2003. In the second stage, the Simar and Wilson 
(2007) procedure is used to bootstrap the DEA scores with a truncated bootstrapped 
regression. The policy implications of our findings are considered. 
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1. Introdution 
 
Efficiency analysis in European banking is a well-established line of research. Studies in 
this field include Molyneux et al. (1996), Altunbas et al. (2001), Goddard et al., (2001), 
Bikker and Haaf, (2002) and Maudos et al. (2002), Schure et al. (2004), Barros et al. 
(2007) and Williams et al. (2008). Factors such as legal tradition, accounting 
conventions, regulatory structures, property rights, culture and religion have been 
suggested as possible explanations for cross-border variations in financial development 
and economic growth (Beck et al., 2003a, b; Beck and Levine, 2004; La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998; Levine, 2003, 2004; Levine et al., 2000; Stulz and Williamson, 2003). In 
addition, market dynamics have also been considered, as bank profits have been found to 
be procyclical (Arpa et al, 2001; Bikker and Hu, 2002), similarly to provisions for loan 
losses,  which can exert a negative impact on the level of economic activity (see 
Cortavarria et al., 2000; Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). 
Another strand of literature emphasises the importance of market structure and bank-
specific variables in explaining performance heterogeneities across banks. This strand 
developed around the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm and has been 
extended to contestable markets, firm-level efficiency and the roles of ownership and 
governance in explaining bank performance (see Berger, 1995; Berger and Humphrey, 
1997; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Goddard et al., 2001; Molyneux et al., 1996). In general, 
the extensive empirical evidence does not provide conclusive proof that bank 
performance is explained either by concentrated market structures and collusive price-
setting behaviour or superior management and production techniques. Bank efficiency 
levels are found to vary widely across European banks and banking sectors (see Altunbaş 
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et al., 2001; Maudos et al., 2002; Schure et al., 2004). 
 
In this paper, the technical efficiency of a representative sample of European banks from 
1993 to 2003 is analysed with a simultaneous two-stage procedure: in the first stage, Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used to estimate the relative efficiency scores ranking 
banks according to their efficiency (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978).1 In the second 
stage, the Simar and Wilson (2007) procedure is applied to bootstrap the DEA scores 
with a truncated regression. Using this approach enables us to obtain more reliable 
evidence compared to previous studies analysing the efficiency of European banks, as the 
Simar and Wilson (2007) procedure ensures the efficient estimation of the second-stage 
estimators, which is not a property of alternative methods. First, the true efficiency score 
θ is not observed directly but is empirically estimated. Thus, the usual estimation 
procedures that assume independently-distributed error terms are not valid. Second, the 
empirical estimates of the efficiency frontier are obtained based on the chosen sample of 
banks, thereby ruling out some efficiency production possibilities not observed in the 
sample. This implies that the empirical estimates of efficiency are upwardly biased 
(Simar and Wilson, 2007). Thirdly, the two-stage procedure also depends upon other 
explanatory variables, which are not taken into account in the first-stage efficiency 
estimation. This implies that the error term must be correlated with the second-stage 
explanatory variables. Fourthly, the domain of the efficient score θ  is restricted to the 
zero-one interval, which should be taken into account in the second-stage estimation 
                                                 
1 DEA was first introduced by Farrell (1957) and then developed by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978) as a non-parametric procedure that compares a decision unit with an 
efficient frontier, using performance indicators.  
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(Simar and Wilson, 2007). The method introduced by Simar and Wilson (2007) 
overcomes these difficulties by adopting a procedure based on a double bootstrap that 
enables consistent inference within models, explaining efficiency scores while 
simultaneously producing standard errors and their confidence intervals. As shown by 
these authors, the alternative bootstrap procedure adopted by Xue and Harker (1999) is 
inconsistent. Moreover, the truncated bootstrapped second-stage regression proposed by 
Simar and Wilson (2007) accounts for the efficiency scores better than a Tobit model. . 
 
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 briefly discusses the theoretical 
literature motivating our empirical analysis. Section 3 outlines the two-stage procedure of 
Simar and Wilson (2007). Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 draws some 
policy implications and concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
There are two main types of theoretical models providing an explanation for within-
industry variation in efficiency. The first are based on strategic-group theory (Caves and 
Porter, 1977), which explains differences in efficiency scores as being due to differences 
in the structural characteristics of units within an industry, which in turn lead to 
differences in performance. In the case of European banking, units with similar asset 
configurations pursue similar strategies, with similar results in terms of performance 
(Porter, 1979). Although there are different strategic options in different sectors of an 
industry, owing to mobility impediments, not all options are available to each bank, 
causing a spread in the efficiency scores of the banking industry. The second type of 
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model adopted is the resource-based one (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1991; Wernerfelt, 
1984), which justifies different efficiency scores in terms of heterogeneity in resources 
and skills on which banks base their strategies. These may not be perfectly mobile across 
the industry, resulting in a competitive advantage for the best-performing banks. An 
example of a resource is cultural tradition. 
Purchasable assets cannot be considered sources of sustainable profits. In this respect 
crucial resources are those not available in the market but rather built up and accumulated 
on the banks’ premises, their non-imitability and non-substitutability being dependent on 
the specific traits of their accumulation process. The difference in resources thus results 
in barriers to imitation (Rumelt, 1991) and in the bank managers’ inability to alter their 
accumulated stock of resources over time. Such unique assets account for inherently 
differentiated levels of efficiency, sustainable profits ultimately being a return on them 
(Teece et al., 1997).  
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
As mentioned above, we follow the two-stage approach of Simar and Wilson (2007). The 
DEA model used in the first stage of our empirical analysis is a non-parametric technique 
that allows the inclusion of multiple inputs and outputs in the production frontier. 
Following Farrell (1957), Charnes et al. (1978) first introduced the term “Data 
Envelopment Analysis” to describe a mathematical programming approach to estimating 
production frontiers and measuring efficiency relative to the frontier. 
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Estimation of Efficiency Scores 
 
To estimate efficiency scores for each observation, we use a DEA estimator.  The DEA 
approach usually (but not always) assumes that all banks, or more broadly, decision-
making units (DMUs) within a sample have access to the same technology for 
transforming a vector of N inputs, denoted by x, into a vector of M outputs, denoted by y. 
We assume that technology can be characterised by the technology set, T, defined as: 
 }:),{( MNMN yproducecanxyxT ++++ ℜ∈ℜ∈ℜ×ℜ∈= .  (1) 
Moreover, we assume that standard regularity conditions of the neo-classical production 
theory hold (for details, see Färe and Primont,, 1995). Having access to the same 
technology, any of the DMUs may or may not be on the frontier; the distance of a 
particular DMU from it may depend on various factors, specific to the DMU. These 
factors may be endogenous to the DMU, such as internal economic incentives influenced 
by the ownership structure, management quality, etc., and/or exogenous, such as different 
macroeconomic and demographic conditions, government regulation policies, etc. The 
distance from the actual location of each DMU given its technology set T from the 
frontier of T is thought to represent the inefficiency of each DMU, caused by the DMU’s 
specific endogenous or exogenous factors and some unexplained statistical noise. Our 
goal is to measure such inefficiency and investigate its dependency on efficiency drivers. 
 
In the first stage of our analysis we estimate efficiency scores for each DMU j (j=1,…, n), 
using the Farrell/Debreu-type output-oriented technical efficiency measure:  
 }),(:{max),( TyxyxTE jjjj ∈= θθθ .     (2) 
 8
In practice, T is unobserved, thus we replace it with its DEA-estimate, Tˆ :  
  :),{(ˆ MNyxT ++ ℜ×ℜ∈=  m
n
k
k
mk yyz ≥∑
=1
,   m = 1, ..., M,  i
n
k
k
ik xxz ≤∑
=1
,   
    i = 1, ..., N, 0≥kz  ,   k = 1, ... , n  }.    (3)  
where 0≥kz   (k = 1, ... , n ) are the intensity variables over which optimisation (2) is 
made. Geometrically, Tˆ  is the smallest convex free-disposal cone (in the ),( yx -space) 
that contains (or ‘envelopes’) the input-output data. For more details on DEA, see Fare, 
Grosskopf and Lovel (1994), Charnes et al. (1995), Coelli, Prasada and Battese (1998), 
Copper et al. (2000) and Thanassoulis (2001), etc. 
 
This is a consistent estimator of the unobserved true technology set T, under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS). Alternatively, non-increasing returns to 
scale (NIRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS) can be considered by adding to (3) the 
constraint 1
1
≤∑ =nk kz  or 11 =∑ =nk kz , respectively.  In this paper, we assume CRS to be 
able to discriminate better between DMUs and then analyse the returns-to-scale 
component in the second stage.  The proof of consistency also requires certain regularity 
conditions (see Kneip et al., 1998, 2003, for these conditions, the resulting rates of 
convergence and the  limiting distribution of the DEA estimator). 
 
We choose this particular efficiency measure over others for several reasons. First, it 
satisfies a set of desirable mathematical properties. These properties include various 
forms of continuity, (weak) monotonicity, commensurability, homogeneity and (weak) 
indication for all technologies satisfying certain regularity conditions (see Russell (1990, 
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1997, for details). Secondly, this measure is also relatively easy to compute and 
straightforward to interpret, and therefore the most widely adopted in practice. 
 
The estimates of the efficiency scores, jET ˆ (j=1,…,n), obtained  by replacing T with Tˆ  
in (2) are consistent estimates of the corresponding true efficiency scores, jTE (j=1,…,n) 
given by (2). They are bounded between unity and infinity, with unity representing an 
estimated perfect (technical or technological) efficiency score of 100%.  On the other 
hand, )ˆ/1( jET  would represent the estimated relative %-level of the efficiency of the j
th 
DMU (j= 1,…, n), relative to the estimated best-practice  technology frontier, Tˆ . 
 
Regression Analysis of Determinants of Efficiency 
 
Next, following Simar and Wilson (2007), we briefly outline regression analysis for 
studying dependency between the efficiency scores and hypothesised explanatory 
variables. We assume and test the following specification: 
jjj ZaTE εδ ++= ,  j = 1, …, n      (4) 
which can be interpreted as the first-order approximation of the unknown true 
relationship.  In equation (4), a is the constant term, jε  is statistical noise, and Zj is a 
(row) vector of observation-specific variables for DMUj that we expect to affect its  
efficiency score, jTE , through the vector of parameters δ  (common for all j) that we 
need to estimate.   
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A common practice in the DEA literature for estimating model (4) had previously been to 
employ the Tobit-estimator, until Simar and Wilson (2007) highlighted the limitations of 
such an approach. Instead, they introduced a method based on a truncated regression with 
a bootstrap and illustrated through Montecarlo experiments its satisfactory performance. 
Here, we will employ their approach.  Specifically, noting that the distribution of jε  is 
restricted by the condition 1j ja Zε δ≥ − −  (since both sides of (7) are bounded by unity), 
we follow Simar and Wilson (2007) and assume that this distribution is truncated normal 
with zero mean (before truncation), unknown variance and a (left) truncation point 
determined by this very condition. Furthermore, we replace the true but unobserved 
regressand in (4), jTE , by its DEA estimate ˆ jTE .  Formally, our econometric model is 
given by: 
ˆ
j j jTE a Z δ ε≈ + + ,  j = 1, …, n,     (5) 
where 
),0(~ 2εσε Nj , such that 1j ja Zε δ≥ − − ,   j = 1, …, n,   (6) 
which we estimate by maximising the corresponding likelihood function, with respect to 
),( 2εσδ , given our data. Relying on asymptotic theory, normal tables can be used to 
construct confidence intervals but more precision can be gained by using the bootstrap. 
This is particularly so because in our analysis the regressand is not an observed variable, 
but an estimate that is likely to be dependent on unobserved variables (see Simar and 
Wilson, 2007, for details). To construct the bootstrap confidence intervals for the 
estimates of the parameters ),( 2εσδ , we use a parametric bootstrap regression method, 
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which incorporates information on the parametric structure and distributional assumption. 
Details of the estimation algorithm can be found in Simar and Wilson (2007). 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
Data Description and Sources 
Financial statement data for commercial banks operating in thirteen EU countries 
between 1993 and 2003 were obtained from the BankScope database. The sample chosen 
requires an explanation. We evaluate domestic and foreign bank performance; the latter 
are bank subsidiaries rather than branches.2 Prior to the creation of the internal market in 
1993, numerous foreign branches were converted into subsidiary operations to take 
advantage of new EC directives and enable competition with domestic banks (European 
Comission, 1997). From 1993 to 2001, banks were exposed to European currency risks, 
which were eliminated for EU-owned banks upon the introduction of the Euro. However, 
other foreign banks have remained subject to currency risk, which could cause biased 
estimates of bank performance. These reasons explain the cut-off points used in this 
study, (ECB, 2004). Two main approaches are adopted in banking to model the frontier, 
the production approach and the intermediate approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). In 
this paper the intermediate approach is adopted. 
 
DEA Results 
The DEA index can be calculated in several ways. Here, we estimate an output-oriented, 
technically efficient (TE) DEA index, assuming that banks aim to maximise the profits 
resulting from their activity. In this context, inputs are exogenous and outputs 
                                                 
2 Foreign-owned banks are classified as banks with 50% or more foreign holdings. 
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endogenous because of the competitive environment in which the units operate 
(Kumbhakar, 1987).  
 
CCR efficient score model, is probably the most widely used and best known DEA 
model. It is the DEA model that assumes constant returns to scale relationship between 
inputs and outputs. It is named following their authors, Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978) and measures the overall efficiency for each unit, namely aggregating pure 
technical efficiency and scale efficiency into one value, Gollani and Roll (1989).  
 
The BCC efficient score model is a DEA model that assumes variable returns to scale 
between inputs and outputs. It is named following their authors, Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (1984) and measure pure technical efficiency alone, Gollani and Roll (1989). The 
efficiency score obtained with the BCC model gives a score which is at least equal to the 
score obtained using the CCR. The scale efficiency score is obtained dividing the 
aggregate CCR score by the technical efficient BCC score, (Fare et al, 1994). A unit is 
scale efficient when its size of operation is optimal. If its size is either reduced or 
increased its efficiency will drop. Assuming that pure technical efficiency is attributed to 
managerial skills, the BCC scores are interpreted as managerial skills. All the DEA 
scores used in the paper are called ratio models, because they define efficiency as the 
ratio of weighted outputs divided by the weighted inputs. They use a radial or 
proportionate measure to determine the technical efficiency. A unit’s technical efficiency 
is defined by the ratio of the distance from the origin to the inefficient unit, divided by the 
distance from the origin to the composite unit on the efficient frontier. 
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Variable returns-to-scale (VRS) were assumed to decompose technical efficiency into 
two different components: pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency (Fare et al, 
1994). The VRS scores measure pure technical efficiency. However, the constant returns-
to-scale (CRS) index is composed of a non-additive combination of pure technical and 
scale efficiencies. A ratio of overall efficiency scores to pure technical efficiency scores 
provides a measurement of scale efficiency. 
 
The relative efficiency of European banks is presented in Table 2, with the banks 
aggregated by country, using a MATLAB program. 
 
A number of points emerge. Firstly, consistently with previous research on European 
banking, there appear to be significant differences in efficiency among the banks 
analysed (Berger, 1995; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Goddard et 
al., 2001; Molyneux et al., 1996). Note that the DEA score is between zero (0%) and 1 
(100%). Units with DEA scores equal to 1 (100%) are efficient. A unit with a score of 
less than 100% is relatively inefficient, e.g. a unit with a score of 95% is only 95% as 
efficient as the best-performing banks. Scores are relative to the other units, i.e., they are 
not absolute. Secondly, best-practice calculations indicate that almost all European banks 
operated at a high level of pure technical efficiency in the period under examination.  
 
Finally, all technically efficient CRS banks are also technically efficient in VRS, 
indicating that the dominant source of efficiency is scale (Gollani and Roll, 1989). CRS is 
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assumed if an increase in a unit’s input leads to a proportionate increase in its outputs. 
This means that, regardless of the scale at which the unit operates, its efficiency will 
remain unchanged, assuming its current operating practices. VRS can be either increasing 
or decreasing returns to scale. In the former case an increase in a unit’s inputs yields a 
greater than proportionate increase in its outputs; in the latter, a decrease in a unit’s inputs 
yields a lower than proportionate increase in output. The above evidence suggests that 
variable returns to scale better characterise the technical efficiency of European banks. 
 
Determinants of Efficiency 
In order to examine the hypothesis that the efficiency of the European banks is 
determined by different variables, we followed the two-step approach, as suggested by 
Coelli et al. (1998), estimating the regression shown below. It is recognised in the DEA 
literature that the efficiency scores obtained in the first stage are correlated with the 
explanatory variables used in the second stage, and that the second-stage estimates will 
then be inconsistent and biased. A bootstrap procedure is needed to overcome this 
problem (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). To this end, as explained earlier, we adopt the 
approach of Simar and Wilson (2007).  
The estimated specification is as follows, Berger and Mester (1997): 
 
titiX
titionLegalTraditiCountrytiTrendtiTrendti
,,5
,4,.3
2
,.2,.10,
εβ
βββββθ
+
+++++=
 (7) 
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where θ represents the DEA-CCR model efficiency score, estimated in table 2. Trend is a 
yearly trend. Square trend is the square value of the trend. Country is a dummy variable, 
which is one for a specific European country and zero otherwise; this aims to capture the 
efficiency related to each European country. Legal tradition is a dummy variable which is 
one for countries with a specific legal tradition (English Common law, French Civil 
Code, Germanic tradition, Scandinavian tradition); this aims to capture efficiency 
orientation strategies inherent to each legal tradition. Finally, X is a continuous variable 
capturing bank characteristics (assets, loans, deposits). Following Simar and Wilson 
(2007), we employ a MATLAB program to bootstrap the confidence intervals, with 2000 
replications. The results are presented in Table 3. 
Several models were estimated for comparison purposes. The results are quite robust, 
since the variables that were significant in Model 1 remained significant after dropping 
the insignificant variables.  Also, country variables all have a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient. Legal tradition also has positive and significant effect in all 
models, with the exception of Scandinavian tradition, which is insignificant in Model 2. 
Finally, deposits’ and loans’ market share both have  positive and significant coefficients, 
while assets’ market share is statistically insignificant.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have adopted the DEA two-stage model to analyse the performance of 
domestic and foreign commercial banks operating in the EU between 1993 and 2003. The 
main innovation in our analysis is to apply the two-stage procedure proposed by Simar 
and Wilson (2007) to bootstrap the DEA scores. This procedure improves both efficiency 
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of estimation and inference. In particular, the adoption of the functional form (truncated 
functional form) in the second stage enables consistent inference with models explaining 
efficiency scores, while simultaneously producing standard errors and confidence 
intervals for these efficiency scores. Benchmarks can be obtained for improving the 
operations of banks that perform poorly. 
Our empirical findings suggest the following: First, legal tradition and foreign ownership 
have implications for public policy. EU policymakers use deregulation to increase 
competition in the banking sector and the wider financial system: initiatives like the 
Financial Services Action Plan have encouraged a competitive and market-based 
structure in the financial services industry, Claessens et al. (2001). Our results imply that 
competition can be enhanced by policies designed to increase foreign bank penetration, 
Barros et al. (2007). The evidence supports the argument that competitive, well-regulated 
markets and the promotion of private property rights and contractual rights help banks to 
gain efficiency advantages that can be exported successfully Humphrey and Pulley, 
(1997). Therefore, EU policymakers should continue to implement policies that increase 
competition and legislate against any remaining legal and regulatory obstacles to 
competition. The projected expansion of US banks within the Euro Area can be expected 
to have a similar effect on competition and should also be encouraged, Berger et al. 
(2000).  
It also seems that location does not affect performance significantly. This is instead 
explained by bank size and the relative importance of banks’ traditional activities. Banks 
with a relatively larger share of the total deposits collected are more likely to perform 
better, as are banks with a higher percentage of loans. Moreover, the larger the relative 
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size of a bank, the more likely it is to perform well. This result supports the conclusion of 
most empirical studies in banking regarding the existence of slight economies of scale in 
the banking industry, and also justifies the European authorities’ efforts to reinforce the 
bank consolidation process initiated in the early 1990s, Williams et al. (2007). More 
research is needed to confirm the present results.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Euro million (inflation-adjusted); 1993-2003 
  Inputs Outputs 
Country Statisti
c 
Fixed  
Assets 
Variable
 Cost 
Custome
r 
Loans 
Interban
k 
Loans 
Securitie
s 
Off-
balance-
sheet 
Austria Averag
e 48.4 263.4 2,801.5 1,474.1 975.0 224.7
 Std dev 224.7 1,023.6 11,275.4 5,589.0 4,171.7 1,028.7
Belgium Averag
e 263.8 1,409.8 11,154.5 5,778.7 8,771.2 46,139.8
 Std dev 
46,139.8 3,492.8 29,153.9 14,780.5 21,893.3 
282,722.
8
Finland Averag
e 401.3 1,449.1 18,860.6 4,614.4 5,350.4 6,496.0
 Std dev 6,496.0 2,300.9 32,981.1 6,944.4 7,424.8 10,869.9
France Averag
e 132.9 1,064.0 6,572.4 3,745.3 4,945.4 4,781.0
 Std dev 608.2 3,959.3 25,007.7 15,361.6 22,200.5 20,896.1
Germany Averag
e 105.7 724.4 6,598.4 2,153.9 3,570.8 2,312.8
 Std dev 671.2 4,271.4 35,479.6 10,509.2 25,861.5 13,455.1
Greece Averag
e 211.7 768.8 4,744.8 1,717.7 3,186.4 10,748.8
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 Std dev 276.1 1,093.0 6,008.3 2,847.7 5,312.5 17,235.3
Ireland Averag
e 110.9 646.1 6,494.1 1,716.6 3,410.0 427.7
 Std dev 298.3 1,268.8 14,221.9 2,543.6 8,722.9 1,079.9
Italy Averag
e 263.2 954.1 8,886.2 2,649.4 2,609.8 4,559.9
 Std dev 717.6 2,625.6 25,336.7 7,497.5 7,720.2 16,170.0
Luxembou
rg 
Averag
e 18.5 333.6 1,061.0 2,285.5 1,271.7 602.9
 Std dev 57.6 679.4 2,455.8 4,242.1 2,777.2 1,631.9
Netherland
s 
Averag
e 427.8 2,225.9 21,960.8 4,244.4 8,303.7 7,644.1
 Std dev 1,416.0 6,963.0 64,555.1 13,199.3 29,416.4 30,076.8
Portugal Averag
e 163.8 582.7 5,412.4 1,727.1 1,422.8 3,352.5
 Std dev 271.2 855.9 9,530.9 2,349.8 2,139.4 5,919.6
Spain Averag
e 291.7 915.4 7,125.7 1,496.0 3,627.6 1,080.2
 Std dev 1,076.9 3,689.9 25,144.5 5,040.5 15,462.0 3,852.8
UK Averag
e 
581.2 
1010.2 8,527.3 2,532.3 5,219.2 4,321.5
 Std dev 1,210.4 2125.3 12,318.4 2,219.5 21,219.3 12,219.3
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Table 2: Efficiency in European Banks  
Country 
DEA-CCR 
model DEA-BCC Model
Scale 
Efficiency 
Austria  0.951 0.958 0.993 
Belgium  0.950 0.954 0.996 
Finland  1.000 1.000 1.000 
France  0.981 1.000 0.981 
Germany  0.973 1.000 0.973 
Greece  0.958 0.972 0.986 
Ireland  0.954 0.971 0.982 
Italy  0.983 1.000 0.983 
Luxembourg  0.952 0.965 0.987 
Netherlands  0.971 0.981 0.990 
Portugal  0.975 0.982 0.993 
Spain  0.985 1.000 0.985 
UK 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Mean 0.969 0.982 0.987 
Median 0.972 0.982 0.986 
St.Dev. 0.016 0.018 0.007 
 
 25
Table 3: Truncated Bootstrapped Second-Stage Regression (dependent variable: CCR 
index) 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 1.16*** 1.10*** 1.16*** 
Trend 0.11*** 0.09** 0.19*** 
Square trend -0.03*** -0.07** -0.07** 
Country 
Austria 
0.035** 0.0044** 0.041** 
Belgium 
0.03** 0.00** 0.04** 
Finland 
0.16*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 
France 
0.01*** 0.012*** 0.02*** 
Germany 
0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
Greece 
0.02** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
Ireland 
0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 
Italy 
1.16*** 1.10*** 1.16*** 
Luxembourg 
0.11*** 0.09** 0.19*** 
Netherlands 
0.03** 0.07** 0.07** 
Portugal 
0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 
Spain 
0.05** 0.07** 0.08** 
UK 
0.12* 0.10* 0.09* 
Legal Tradition 
English Common law 
0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
French Civil Code 
0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
Germanic tradition 
0.08*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 
Scandinavian tradition 
0.05* 0.04  
Banks’ characteristics 
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Foreign ownership 
0.07*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
Deposits market share1 
0.23*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 
Loans market share1 
0.08*** 0.07** 0.05** 
Assets market share1 
0.02   
Variance 0.03 0.03 0.04 
(1) The percentage of assets, loans and customer deposits held by the bank to the total 
amount of each variable over the period. 
***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.     
 
 
